



LE REGISTRAIRE DES MARQUES DE COMMERCE
THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE-MARKS

Citation: 2011 TMOB 148
Date of Decision: 2011-08-23

**IN THE MATTER OF AN OPPOSITION by
Alberto Carreras Coll to application
No. 1,237,288 for the trade-mark LAKME
BEAUTY SALON in the name of Hindustan
Unilever Limited**

[1] On November 16, 2004, Hindustan Unilever Limited (the Applicant) filed an application to register the trade-mark LAKME BEAUTY SALON (the Mark) based upon proposed use of the Mark in Canada. The statement of services, as revised, reads as follows:

Medical, hygienic and beauty care services, namely beauty salons, providing hand and foot massages, body massages, skin care, medical clinics, health care consultation, baths for hygiene and health purposes, Ayurvedic health treatment, advice on positive health, stress relief, aches, pains, weight loss, beauty consultation, yoga instruction, massage therapy, body cleaning (the Services).

[2] The application includes a disclaimer of the right to the exclusive use of the words BEAUTY SALON apart from the Mark and was advertised for opposition purposes in the *Trade-marks Journal* of September 28, 2005.

[3] On February 28, 2006, Alberto Carreras Coll (the Opponent) filed a statement of opposition claiming that the application does not conform to the requirements of s. 38(2)(a) and s. 30(i) of the *Trade-marks Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 (the Act). The statement of opposition also claims that the Mark is not registrable pursuant to s. 38(2)(b) and s. 12(1)(d) of the Act, that it is non-distinctive of the Applicant pursuant to s. 38(2)(d) and s. 2 of the Act, and that the Applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the Mark pursuant to s. 38(2)(c) and s. 16(3)(a) of the

Act in view of the fact that the Mark is confusing with the Opponent's LAKMÉ trade-mark, registered under No. TMA496,016 and which has been previously used or made known in Canada by the Opponent or his predecessors in title in association with the following wares: "oxidation dyes, semi-permanent wave coloring, direct coloring, uncoloring powders, peroxides, permanent waves, uncurlers and neutralizers, lacquers, hair sprays, hair creams, gels, waxes, plis, shampoos, hair conditioners, beauty masks, hair extracts and lotions".

[4] The Applicant filed and served a counter statement in which it denies the Opponent's allegations.

[5] In support of his opposition, the Opponent filed an affidavit of his, sworn June 5, 2007, as well as an affidavit of Jaclyn M. Seidman, sworn May 22, 2007, and a certified copy of registration No. TMA496,016 for the LAKMÉ trade-mark. In support of its application, the Applicant filed the affidavit of Kathryn Stewart, sworn March 10, 2008. Ms. Stewart was cross-examined on her affidavit and the transcript of her cross-examination forms part of the record. The Opponent further filed, as reply evidence, a second affidavit of Ms. Seidman, sworn September 25, 2008.

[6] Both parties filed written arguments. An oral hearing was not requested.

Onus and relevant dates

[7] The Applicant bears the legal onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that its application complies with the requirements of the Act. However, there is an initial evidentiary burden on the Opponent to adduce sufficient admissible evidence from which it could reasonably be concluded that the facts alleged to support each ground of opposition exist [see *John Labatt Ltd v. Molson Companies Ltd.* (1990), 30 C.P.R. (3d) 293 (F.C.T.D.); and *Dion Neckwear Ltd. v. Christian Dior, S.A. et al.* (2002), 20 C.P.R. (4th) 155 (F.C.A.)].

[8] The relevant dates for considering the circumstances in regard to each of the grounds of opposition in the present proceeding are the following:

- Ground based on s. 38(2)(a) / s. 30(i) of the Act: the date of filing of the application [see *Tower Conference Management Co. v. Canadian Exhibition Management Inc.* (1990), 28 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (T.M.O.B.)];
- Ground based on s. 38(2)(b) / s. 12(1)(d) of the Act: the date of my decision [see *Park Avenue Furniture Corp. v. Wickers/Simmons Bedding Ltd.* (1991), 37 C.P.R. (3d) 413 (F.C.A.)];
- Grounds based on s. 38(2)(c) / s. 16(3)(a) of the Act: the date of filing of the application; and
- Ground based on s. 38(2)(d) / s. 2 of the Act: the filing date of the opposition [see *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Stargate Connections Inc.* (2004), 34 C.P.R. (4th) 317 (F.C.); and *Re Andres Wines Ltd. and E. & J. Gallo Winery* (1975), 25 C.P.R. (2d) 126 (F.C.A.)].

Analysis of the grounds of opposition

Section 30(i) ground of opposition

[9] The Opponent has pleaded that the application does not comply with the requirements of s. 30(i) of the Act in that “[t]he Applicant cannot be satisfied that it is entitled to use the [Mark] in association with the [Services] because the Applicant has known that the trade-mark LAKMÉ has been extensively used in Canada by the Opponent in association with [the wares described above]”.

[10] This ground, as pleaded, does not raise a proper ground of opposition. The mere fact that the Applicant may have been aware of the existence of the Opponent’s LAKMÉ trade-mark does not preclude it from making the statement in its application required by s. 30(i) of the Act.

[11] Even if the ground had been properly pleaded, where an applicant has provided the statement required by s. 30(i), a s. 30(i) ground should only succeed in exceptional circumstances such as where there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the applicant [see *Sapodilla Co. Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers Co.* (1974), 15 C.P.R. (2d) 152 (T.M.O.B.)]. There is no such evidence in the present case.

[12] Therefore, the s. 30(i) ground of opposition is dismissed.

Remaining grounds of opposition

[13] The s. 12(1)(d) (non-registrability), s. 16(3)(a) (non-entitlement) and s. 2 (non-distinctiveness) grounds of opposition all revolve around the issue of the likelihood of confusion between the Mark and the Opponent's trade-mark LAKMÉ. I will assess the s. 12(1)(d) ground of opposition first as it is the strongest given the latest material date.

Non-registrability ground of opposition

[14] The Opponent has pleaded that the Mark is not registrable having regard to the provisions of s. 12(1)(d) of the Act in that it is confusing with the Opponent's registered trade-mark LAKMÉ described above.

[15] As indicated above, the Opponent has provided a certified copy of his registration. I have exercised the Registrar's discretion to confirm that it is in good standing as of today's date.

[16] As the Opponent's evidentiary burden has been satisfied, the Applicant must therefore establish, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no reasonable likelihood of confusion between the Mark and the Opponent's LAKMÉ trade-mark.

[17] The test for confusion is one of first impression and imperfect recollection. Section 6(2) of the Act indicates that use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares or services are of the same general class.

[18] In applying the test for confusion, the Registrar must have regard to all the surrounding circumstances, including those listed at s. 6(5) of the Act, namely: (a) the inherent distinctiveness

of the trade-marks and the extent to which they have become known; b) the length of time the trade-marks have been in use; c) the nature of the wares, services or business; d) the nature of the trade; and e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them. This list is not exhaustive; all relevant factors are to be considered, and are not necessarily attributed equal weight [see *Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc.* (2006), 49 C.P.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.); and *Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée* (2006), 49 C.P.R. (4th) 401 (S.C.C.) for a thorough discussion of the general principles that govern the test for confusion].

[19] The Opponent's LAKMÉ trade-mark is inherently distinctive, not describing any particular feature of the Opponent's wares associated therewith. Indeed, the Opponent explains in his affidavit that in 1996, he developed the idea to create a range of hair care products and incorporated a company with the name LAKMÉ, after the opera by that name written in 1883 by Edmond Gondinet and Philippe Gille, music by Delibes. The Applicant's Mark as a whole is also inherently distinctive, owing to the word LAKME, which, as confirmed by the Applicant itself, has no English or French translation and is the name of an opera.

[20] The strength of a trade-mark may be increased by means of it becoming known through promotion or use. However, there is no evidence that the Applicant's proposed use Mark has been used in Canada pursuant to s. 4 of the Act or that it has become known to any extent whatsoever in Canada.

[21] Turning to the Opponent's LAKMÉ trade-mark, the Opponent's registration No. TMA496,016 issued on September 25, 1996 on the basis of use and registration of the mark in Spain. Such registration in itself can establish no more than *de minimis* use and cannot give rise to an inference of significant or continuing use of the LAKMÉ trade-mark in Canada [see *Entre Computer Centers, Inc. v. Global Upholstery Co.* (1992), 40 C.P.R. (3d) 427 (T.M.O.B.)]. That said, I am satisfied from my review of the Coll affidavit below, that the Opponent's LAKMÉ trade-mark has, indeed, been used continuously in Canada since at least 1999 and become known to some extent in this country in association with hair care products.

[22] Mr. Coll first provides a history of the use of the trade-mark LAKMÉ. Mr. Coll states that he is the founder and shareholder of Lakmé Cosmetics SL (Lakmé Cosmetics) [paragraph 1 of his affidavit]. Mr. Coll developed the idea to create a range of hair care products with the name LAKMÉ and incorporated Lakmé Cosmetics in the year 1996. Lakmé Cosmetics commenced selling products marked with the trade-mark LAKMÉ that same year [paragraph 2 of his affidavit].

[23] Mr. Coll states that he has always been the owner of the trade-mark LAKMÉ, which he has registered in many countries of the world, including Canada [paragraphs 3 and 4 of his affidavit; Exhibits A and B]. He explains that Lakmé Cosmetics sells products marked with the trade-mark LAKMÉ in 60 countries, including Canada. More particularly, the trade-mark LAKMÉ has been used in Canada since 1999 in association with hair care products. He adds that by virtue of a license agreement between him and Lakmé Cosmetics, his company has an exclusive license to use the trade-mark LAKMÉ and variants thereof, including the corporate trade-name Lakmé Cosmetics [paragraph 5 of his affidavit].

[24] More particularly, Mr. Coll explains that pursuant to this license, Lakmé Cosmetics is entitled to manufacture, label, package, distribute, market and sell products marked with the trade-mark LAKMÉ and use LAKMÉ as part of its corporate name. Pursuant to the license agreement, Lakmé Cosmetics must observe and comply with all requirements, procedures and directions which he imposes with respect to the use of the trade-mark LAKMÉ. Also, by virtue of the license, he has direct or indirect control of the character or quality of the goods marked with the trade-mark LAKMÉ by his company. In addition, Mr. Coll states that since he is involved on a daily basis in developing products and marketing strategies, he personally regularly attends Lakmé Cosmetics' head office and plants and reviews manufacturing and distribution of hair care products marketed under the trade-mark LAKMÉ [paragraph 6 of his affidavit].

[25] Mr. Coll then describes how the trade-mark LAKMÉ is used in Canada. He states that Lakmé Cosmetics sells hair care products in association with the trade-mark LAKMÉ to four exclusive distributors in Quebec, Ontario, Western Zone (Burnaby) and Center Zone

(Edmonton), who in turn sell the products to beauty salons and hairdressers who sell directly to the ultimate consumers throughout the country. In total, approximately 300 retailers across Canada sell hair care products marked with the trade-mark LAKMÉ. These products include the ones listed in the Opponent's registration No. TMA496,016. To this end, Mr. Coll attaches as Exhibit C copies of photographs of representative packages of products prominently displaying the trade-mark LAKMÉ, namely 300 ml bottles of shampoo and conditioner [paragraphs 7 and 8 of his affidavit].

[26] Mr. Coll states that since 1999, sales of hair care products bearing the trade-mark LAKMÉ in Canada have exceeded \$3,100,000. This represents an average of approximately 67,000 units of hair care products bearing the trade-mark LAKMÉ sold on an annual basis [paragraph 10 of his affidavit].

[27] Mr. Coll then turns to the advertising of these hair care products. He explains that such advertising is made through printed brochures [see Exhibit D that consists of copies of five brochures which are representative of those which have been distributed since 1999 in Canada]; point of sale materials provided to Canadian retailers such as posters and banners bearing the trade-mark LAKMÉ for display in their salons [see Exhibit E that depicts the manner in which some Canadian retailers display products bearing the trade-mark LAKMÉ for sale]; advertisements for the LAKMÉ product line in printed publications such as trade journals, magazines and newspapers which circulated in Canada [see Exhibit F that consists of copies of advertisements which appeared in various 2000 and 2006 issues of *Salon Magazine*]; and Lakmé Cosmetics' website *www.lakme.com* [see Exhibit G that consists of printouts displaying the trade-mark LAKMÉ which are representative of the manner in which such trade-mark has been promoted online] [paragraphs 11 to 15 of his affidavit].

[28] The Applicant contends in its written argument that the Opponent has not evidenced that the prior use of the trade-mark LAKMÉ by Lakmé Cosmetics was licensed. More particularly, the Applicant contends that Mr. Coll does not state when the license referred to in his affidavit began nor does he attach a copy of the license agreement to his affidavit. Accordingly, the Applicant contends that it cannot be assumed that any use that Lakmé Cosmetics made of the

trade-mark LAKMÉ prior to the swearing of Mr. Coll's affidavit was pursuant to a license from the Opponent. The Applicant further contends that use by Lakmé Cosmetics of "LAKMÉ" and "LAKMÉ COSMETICS" is only as a trade-name. I disagree.

[29] As per my review above of the history of the use of the trade-mark LAKMÉ, it is apparent that Lakmé Cosmetics' use of the trade-mark LAKMÉ has always been made under license. To otherwise read Mr. Coll's affidavit simply does not make sense. Furthermore, the trade-mark LAKMÉ is prominently displayed on its own on the bottles of shampoo and conditioner filed as Exhibit C, as well as on many of the packaging of the hair care products pictured in Exhibits D and F. Accordingly, I am satisfied that there has been use of the trade-mark LAKMÉ by Lakmé Cosmetics, as shown by Mr. Coll, and that such use enures to the benefit of the Opponent pursuant to s. 50 of the Act.

[30] In view of the foregoing, the overall consideration of the inherent distinctiveness of the parties' marks and the extent to which they have become known, as well as of the length of time the trade-marks have been in use, favour the Opponent.

[31] Turning to the nature of the wares and the nature of the trade, I must compare the Applicant's statement of services with the statement of wares in the Opponent's registration [see *Henkel Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien v. Super Dragon Import Export Inc.* (1986), 12 C.P.R. (3d) 110 (F.C.A.); and *Mr. Submarine Ltd. v. Amandista Investments Ltd.* (1987), 19 C.P.R. (3d) 3 (F.C.A.)]. However, those statements must be read with a view to determining the probable type of business or trade intended by the parties rather than all possible trades that might be encompassed by the wording. The evidence of the parties' actual trades is useful in this respect [see *McDonald's Corp. v. Coffee Hut Stores Ltd.* (1996), 68 C.P.R. (3d) 168 (F.C.A.); *Procter & Gamble Inc. v. Hunter Packaging Ltd.* (1999), 2 C.P.R. (4th) 266 (T.M.O.B.); and *American Optional Corp. v. Alcon Pharmaceuticals Ltd.* (2000), 5 C.P.R. (4th) 110 (T.M.O.B.)].

[32] The Opponent, relying on the Coll and Seidman affidavits, and the exhibit to the Applicant's own evidence introduced through the Stewart affidavit, submits that the parties' respective wares and services are part of one industry and could be offered potentially in close

proximity to the public through the same types of establishments, namely spas, hair salons and beauty salons.

[33] More particularly, the Opponent submits that the Coll affidavit establishes that LAKMÉ hair products are sold in Canada to beauty salons and hairdressers who sell directly to the ultimate consumers throughout the country. The Coll and Seidman affidavits as well as the Applicant's own evidence demonstrate that these types of establishments commonly also offer spa services such as those proposed to be used in Canada by the Applicant, as per the following materials:

- Exhibit H to the Coll affidavit that consists of printouts from the Applicant's website at *www.lakmeindia.com* that Mr. Coll accessed. Mr. Coll states at paragraph 17 of his affidavit that he is aware that the Applicant has commenced use of the Mark in India with wares and services which directly overlap with the hair care products which Lakmé Cosmetics sells. The printouts include the following descriptions:

Lakme Beauty Salons offer a full range of the latest beauty and grooming services in the areas of hair care, skin care and beauty. The services include specialized services for skin (facials), hair (colouring, cuts, styles, perms etc), hands & feet (advanced manicures and pedicures) as well as essential beauty services (waxing, pedicures, manicures).

[...]

Lakme presents Hairnext. An exclusive range of hair care products that gives you that salon look, instantly.

Lakme, with its expertise in the beauty care industry, is now making a foray into the hair care market. [...]

- The various exhibits attached to the first affidavit of Ms. Seidman. Ms. Seidman explains in her affidavit that she attended Yves Rocher retail location in the Toronto Eaton Centre. Yves Rocher's retail location is comprised of the Yves Rocher Botanical Beauty Spa and the Yves Rocher Beauty Centre. The spa offers aesthetic treatments, namely facials, hair removal, make-up, hand-beauty treatment, foot beauty treatment and massage. Before

entering the Yves Rocher Botanical Beauty Spa, Yves Rocher has a storefront Beauty Centre that sells a variety of Yves Rocher products, including hair care products [paragraphs 3 to 8 of her affidavit, Exhibits A to E that consist of specimens of brochures and catalogues gathered by Ms. Seidman and photographs taken by her while attending at the Yves Rocher location]. Ms. Seidman further states that she also attended the Aveda location in the Yorkdale Shopping Mall in Toronto and Jalouse Hair Inc. located at 2467 Yonge Street in Toronto. Both of these locations offer spa services and sell hair care products [paragraphs 9 to 17 of her affidavit, Exhibits F to N].

- Exhibit A to the Stewart affidavit that consists of a printout of the webpage displaying the search result for the term “BEAUTY SALON” from Wikipedia. The webpage includes the following definition:

A beauty salon or beauty parlor (or sometimes beauty shop) is an establishment dealing with cosmetic treatments for men and women. Other variations of this type of business include hair salons and spas.

There is a distinction between a beauty salon and a hair salon and although many small business do offer both sets of treatments, beauty salons are based more around face and body treatments.

[...]

Beauty salons offer treatments such as waxing and threading for hair removal. Beauty salons may include also all services, such as: Hair, nail, estetics [sic], massage, solarium, etc.

The webpage also includes a picture of “A beauty salon in Salt Lake City”, which is called “Eduardo’s Beauty Salon”. Underneath the words “Eduardo’s Beauty Salon”, are the words “hair-cut, perm, color and highlight”. The webpage also includes a picture of the “Interior of a beauty salon”, showing people having their hair cut inside of this beauty salon [also confirmed by Ms. Stewart at pp. 9 and 10 of the transcript of her cross-examination].

[34] The Applicant for its part submits that the wares in the Opponent’s registration are all

related to hair products and, in particular products relating to hair colouring. By way of contrast, the Applicant's Services set out in its application do not relate to hair colouring or hair care. The Applicant, relying on a decision of this Board in *Omnium de la Parfumerie de Luxe v. First Jewellery Co. of Canada Inc.* (1992), 41 C.P.R. (3d) 444 (*Omnium*), submits that the lack of a connection between the Applicant's Services and the Opponent's wares is fatal to this opposition. I disagree with the Applicant.

[35] First, the Opponent's products encompass both hair colouring and hair care. Second, Mr. Coll states in his affidavit that Lakmé Cosmetics' exclusive distributors sell such products to both beauty salons and hairdressers who sell directly to the ultimate consumers throughout Canada. Third, the Applicant's own evidence supports the Opponent's position that beauty salons and hair salons are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, Exhibit A to the Stewart affidavit expressly indicates that beauty salons may also include all services, such as hair care, as further evidenced by the first affidavit of Ms. Seidman. In this regard, I do not find it necessary to discuss the reliability of material from Wikipedia and comment in detail on the second affidavit of Ms. Seidman addressing such issue. Suffice it to say that the online edition of the Oxford Dictionaries provides the following definition of "beauty salon" (also "beauty parlor"): "an establishment in which hairdressing, makeup, and similar cosmetic treatments are carried out professionally". Fourth, the printouts of the Applicant's own website attached as Exhibit H to the Coll affidavit further tend to discredit the Applicant's position although I acknowledge that they do not establish the truth of their contents [see *Candrug Health Solutions Inc. v. Thorkelson* (2007), 60 C.P.R. (4th) 35 (F.C.), reversed (2008), 64 C.P.R. (4th) 431 (F.C.A.)]. Fifth, s. 6(2) of the Act indicates that use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, *whether or not the wares or services are of the same general class*.

[36] The present case is further distinguishable from that in the *Omnium* decision. In *Omnium*, the applicant applied to register the trade-mark FIRST based on proposed use for "jewellery" and the services of "operating a wholesale business dealing in the sale of jewellery". The opponent relied on a registration for FIRST Design for "perfumes; toilet waters; bubble bath preparations;

perfume and lotions; perfume gels; perfume powders; soaps; and personal deodorants”. In rejecting the opponent’s opposition, former Chairman Partington found that in the absence of satisfactory evidence which would allow him to conclude otherwise, there would be no overlapping in the channels of trade associated with the wares and services of the parties. There had also been concurrent use of the parties’ marks without any evidence of confusion. Unlike in *Omnium*, there is in the present case evidence of a connection existing between the parties’ wares and services. There is also no evidence of concurrent use of the parties’ marks.

[37] This brings me to address the degree of resemblance between the parties’ trade-marks. As put forward by the Opponent, the first portion of the Mark is identical to the Opponent’s trade-mark. The only other elements forming part of the Mark is the inclusion of the descriptive phrase “BEAUTY SALON”, which has been disclaimed. The dominant feature of the Mark is the distinctive word “LAKME”. As such, I agree with the Opponent that there is a fair degree of resemblance between the parties’ marks.

Conclusion regarding the likelihood of confusion

[38] As indicated above, the Applicant bears the legal onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that its application complies with the requirements of the Act. The presence of a legal onus on the Applicant means that if a determinate conclusion cannot be reached once all the evidence is in, then the issue must be decided against the Applicant.

[39] I am of the view that the Opponent’s evidence raises sufficient doubts as to the likelihood of confusion considering the fact that there is a fair degree of resemblance between the parties’ marks, that the Opponent’s LAKMÉ trade-mark has been used and become known in Canada over the last decade, and that the parties’ respective wares and services could be offered potentially in close proximity to the public through the same types of establishments, namely spas, hair salons and beauty salons. As such, I find that the Applicant has not met its legal onus to show that, on a balance of probabilities, it is not reasonably likely that an individual who has an imperfect recollection of the Opponent’s LAKMÉ trade-mark as applied to hair care products, would not, as a matter of first impression and imperfect recollection conclude that the

Applicant's Services share a common source.

[40] Accordingly, the s. 12(1)(d) ground of opposition succeeds.

Non-distinctiveness ground of opposition

[41] The Opponent has pleaded that the Mark is not distinctive of the Applicant nor does it actually distinguish the Services of the Applicant from the wares of others, including the Opponent, nor is it adapted to distinguish them.

[42] An opponent meets its initial onus with respect to a non-distinctiveness ground if it shows that as of the filing date of the statement of opposition its trade-mark had a substantial, significant or sufficient reputation in Canada so as to negate the distinctiveness of the applied-for mark [see *Bojangles' International LLC v. Bojangles Café Ltd.* (2006), 48 C.P.R. (4th) 427 (F.C.)]. As per my review of the Opponent's evidence above, the Opponent has met this burden.

[43] The ground therefore remains to be decided on the issue of confusion between the marks as of the filing date of the statement of opposition. As I came to the conclusion that, based on the evidence filed in the record, the Mark is confusing with the Opponent's LAKMÉ trade-mark under s. 12(1)(d) and because the difference in relevant dates does not substantially affect my analysis, the non-distinctiveness ground of opposition therefore succeeds.

Non-entitlement ground of opposition

[44] As I have already refused the application under two grounds, I will not address the remaining ground of opposition.

Disposition

[45] In view of the foregoing and pursuant to the authority delegated to me under s. 63(3) of the Act, I refuse the application pursuant to s. 38(8) of the Act.

Annie Robitaille
Member
Trade-marks Opposition Board
Canadian Intellectual Property Office