Trademark Opposition Board Decisions

LE REGISTRAIRE DES MARQUES DE COMMERCE

THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE-MARKS

Citation: 2012 TMOB 55

Date of Decision: 2012-03-22

IN THE MATTER OF AN OPPOSITION by ICI Canada Inc. to application No. 1,338,960 for the trade-mark JACKPOT-Colour My World in the name of IC Companys A/S

[1]               On March 12, 2007 IC Companys A/S (the Applicant) filed an application to register the trade-mark JACKPOT – Colour My World (the Mark); the priority filing date is October 27, 2006. The application is based upon proposed use in Canada and use and registration in Denmark in association with the following wares:

Clothing, namely: coats, jackets, trousers, pants, skirts, dresses, shirts, blouses, shorts, jeans, waistcoats, hats, caps, gloves, handkerchiefs, scarves, belts, jump-suits, jump-dresses, overalls, t-shirts, pullovers and sweaters, vests, bathing suits, underwear, socks, boots, shoes and slippers; trunks, travelling bags, suitcases, handbags, umbrellas, shopping bags; perfumery, deodorants for personal use, soaps, namely beauty soaps, skin soaps and bath soaps, shampoos, aftershave, cosmetics, namely foundation make-up, face powders, eye shadows, eye liners, eye pencils, lipsticks, lip gloss, mascaras, nail polish; hair lotions and dentifrices.

[2]               The application was advertised for opposition purposes in the Trade-marks Journal of February 20, 2008.  A statement of opposition was filed by ICI Canada Inc. (the Opponent), on July 21, 2008. The Applicant filed and served a counter statement on October 21, 2008, denying all the allegations in the statement of opposition.

[3]               The Opponent filed the affidavits of Mary P. Noonan, Suzanne La Rose, and Chris J. Kosmala, as well as certified copies of trade-mark registrations relied on by the Opponent.  The Applicant filed the affidavit of Stephanie Brouillette.

[4]               The Applicant filed written submissions and did not participate in the oral hearing; the Opponent did not file written submissions and was represented at the oral hearing.

Onus

[5]               The Applicant bears the legal onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities that its application complies with the requirements of the Act. However, there is an initial evidential burden on the Opponent to adduce sufficient admissible evidence from which it could reasonably be concluded that the facts alleged to support each ground of opposition exist [see John Labatt Limited v. The Molson Companies Limited (1990), 30 C.P.R. (3d) 293 (F.C.T.D.) at 298].

Grounds of Opposition pursuant to the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 (the Act)

Section 38(2)(a )and s. 30/Section 38(2)(c) and s.16(2)

[6]               The material date for non-compliance with s. 30 of the Act is the filing date of the application (March 12, 2007), [see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Scott Paper Ltd. (1984), 3 C.P.R. (3d) 469 at 475 (T.M.O.B); Canadian National Railway Co. v. Schwauss (1991), 35 C.P.R. (3d) 90 (T. M.O.B.)].

[7]               In its statement of opposition the Opponent pleaded under s. 38(2)(a) that the subject application contravened s. 30(d) and s. 16(2) of the Act since its investigation failed to reveal use of the Mark in Denmark. The Opponent filed the affidavit of Suzanna La Rose in this regard. Ms La Rose states that she reviewed present day and archived web pages of www.jackpot.dk (through the WayBackMachine), and that her review did not reveal any use of the Mark. The affiant does provide that the phrase “Colour My World” appears in an online magazine found in her search of the present day website. Copies of these pages are attached as Exhibit A which consists of an article entitled COLOUR MY WORLD comprising excerpts of interviews with women on the subject of spring clothing. I note that no products are offered for sale, and also that JACKPOT appears, under the title of the article, in the sentence - “Jackpot took to the street to hear about what can make Copenhageners who are hungry for spring really happy”. In particular I observe that no copies are attached of any of the archived pages reviewed; Exhibit B provides only a listing of pages and dates accessed.  

[8]               I agree with the Applicant that the absence of the Mark on one particular website is insufficient to meet the Opponent’s initial evidentiary burden in this regard.  At this point it would be useful to point out that the Applicant provided web pages relating to the nature of the Applicant’s business from a different website: www.iccompanys.com, identified as the Applicant’s website (Exhibit SB-1 to the affidavit of Stephanie Brouillette).

[9]               In any event, in my view, the Opponent’s allegation implies an unsubstantiated assumption that use of a trade-mark must necessarily include exposure on the Internet. I do not consider this to be the case, particularly in the case of wares, since such use by itself would not satisfy s. 4(1) of the Act, in any event. Failure to find an Internet presence in such limited circumstances as the search of one website, which may or may not have been the Applicant’s primary website at the material date, is not sufficient to support this ground of opposition. This ground is therefore summarily dismissed.  

[10]           In its statement of opposition the Opponent pleaded under s. 38(2)(a) that the Mark is not registrable pursuant to s. 30(i) because at all material dates including the date of filing the application, the Applicant could not have been satisfied that it was entitled to use the Mark in association with the wares in the application (as originally filed), which included:

Belts, coats, ear muffs, gloves, hats, head bands, head wear, hosiery, jackets, jerseys, kerchiefs, leotards, leg warmers, pajamas, pants, roves, sandals, scarves, shirts, shorts, slippers, socks, stockings, sweaters, tights, t-shirts, vests, backpacks, beachbags, handbags and shopping bags.

[11]           This ground may be summarily dismissed since the Applicant has provided the statement required by s. 30(i), and this ground should only succeed in exceptional cases such as where there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the applicant [Sapodilla Co. Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers Co. (1974), 15 C.P.R. (2d) 152 (T.M.O.B.); Multi-Marques Inc. et al. v Gesfor Aktiengesellschaft (2008), 74 C.P.R. (4th) (T.M.O.B.)]. As the application includes the required statement and there is no allegation or evidence of bad faith or other exceptional circumstances, the s. 30(i) ground is dismissed.

[12]           The Opponent also alleged that the application contravened s. 16(2) in that the claim of use and registration in Denmark was not in compliance with the Act since the Mark had not been used in Denmark as specified in the application. I am of the view that an allegation that a trade-mark was not used in the country of the Union specified in the application does not form the basis of a proper ground under this section of the Act [see Canada Post Corporation v Deutsche Post AG, 2011 TMOB 210]. Section 16 relates to non-entitlement by virtue of the prior use or application of a trade-mark or trade-name of a third party; the ground was not pleaded on this basis and is therefore summarily dismissed. In any event, if I am wrong in so finding, the facts alleged in support of this ground, namely that no evidence of use of the Mark was found in Denmark, are unsupported and insufficient to support the pleading for the reasons set out in paragraph [9] above.

Section 38(2)(b) and s. 12(1)(d)

[13]           The Opponent pleaded that the Mark is not registrable pursuant to s. 12(1)(d) of the Act as it is confusing within the meaning of s. 6 with the Opponent’s registered trade-marks as listed below:

 

[14]            The material date for determining the likelihood of confusion under s. 12(1)(d) is the date of this decision [Park Avenue Furniture Corporation v. Wickes/Simmons Bedding Ltd. and The Registrar of Trade Marks (1991), 37 C.P.R. (3d) 413 (F.C.A.)].  I have exercised my discretion and confirmed that five of the Opponent’s registrations relied on above are extant, and thus sufficient for the Opponent to meet its burden under this ground with respect to those existing registrations.  However, TMA321,882 and TMA323, 582 were expunged on July 19, 2010 and October 28, 2010 respectively; this ground of opposition is therefore dismissed with respect to these two former registrations.

[15]            The Applicant must therefore establish, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no reasonable likelihood of confusion between its Mark and any of the trade-marks that are the subject of the Opponent’s existing trade-mark registrations, namely: TMA193,123, TMA195,678, TMA210,131, TMA579,436 and TMA579,533. The latter two registrations are in respect of design marks as reproduced below:

TMA579,436                                                  TMA579,533

[16]           I note that COLOR is disclaimed in each of the Opponent’s registrations. The Opponent’s trade-marks are registered in association with wares and services that can generally be described as the sale of paint, wallpaper, flooring, window coverings and home decorating items. The respective lists of wares and services as registered are shown in attached Schedule A.

[17]           The test for confusion is one of first impression and imperfect recollection. Section 6(2) of the Act indicates that use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares or services are of the same general class. The purchaser in mind is described as the casual consumer somewhat in a hurry (Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc. (2006), 49 C.P.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.) at para. 58).  Generally, it is not a proper approach to place the trade-marks side by side to compare their components. They must be considered as a whole. The question is whether this mythical consumer with a vague recollection of the first mark will, on seeing the second comer’s mark, infer as a matter of first impression that the wares with which the second mark is used are in some way associated with the wares bearing the first mark [United States Polo Assn. v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., (2000) 9 C.P.R. (4th) 51 (F.C.A.) at 58].

[18]           In applying the test for confusion, the Registrar must have regard to all the surrounding circumstances, including those specifically enumerated in s. 6(5) of the Act, namely: (a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks and the extent to which they have become known; (b) the length of time each has been in use; (c) the nature of the wares, services or business; (d) the nature of the trade; and (e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.

[19]           These factors need not be attributed equal weight; rather, the weight to be given to each relevant factor may vary, depending on the circumstances [see Clorox Co. v. Sears Canada Inc. (1992), 41 C.P.R. (3d) 483 (F.C.T.D.); Gainers Inc. v. Marchildon (1996), 66 C.P.R. (3d) 308 (F.C.T.D.)].  Furthermore, the list of factors set out is not exhaustive of matters that could be considered [see in general Mattel supra; United Artists Corp. v. Pink Panther Beauty Corp. (1988), 80 C.P.R. (3d) 247 (F.C.A.) at 263-264; Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée. (2006), 49 C.P.R. (4th) 401 (S.C.C.)].

[20]           The analysis will consider the issue of confusion with the word mark COLOR YOUR WORLD which is the subject of three of the Opponent’s registrations, since this is the Opponent’s strongest case.  I would also remark here that the design marks do not include elements that are particularly striking or distinctive so as to alter a finding of confusion, or lack thereof, with respect to the word marks. For the purposes of clarity, the Opponent’s three word mark registrations will be referred to as the Opponent’s trade-mark in this discussion.

Section 6(5)(a) - Inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks and the extent to which they have become known

[21]           When considering the issue of inherent distinctiveness, it is clear that the trade-marks at issue are composed of dictionary words. In addition, the Opponent’s trade-mark COLOR YOUR WORLD is, in its entirety, a phrase or slogan that I do not consider to be a unique combination of words. Further, in association with the primary wares of paint and wall paper, it is highly suggestive in that it suggests to consumers that they colour their surroundings or “world” with paint.  In fact, exclusive use of COLOR is disclaimed apart from the trade-mark in each registration. In contrast, the Mark, JACKPOT– Colour my World, has more inherent distinctiveness as it is composed of two elements that are unrelated to each other, namely, the word JACKPOT and the phrase COLOUR MY WORLD.  Further, the phrase COLOUR MY WORLD is more figurative in relation to clothing and cosmetics, since these wares are not instruments or methods of applying colour to the surroundings on the same scale as paint or wallpaper. In any event, inclusion of JACKPOT renders the Mark rather mystifying as JACKPOT has no apparent descriptive significance at all. Therefore, I find the Mark as a whole, more inherently distinctive than the Opponent’s trade-mark.

[22]           With respect to acquired distinctiveness, I note that no evidence of use of the Mark by the Applicant has been provided; however, the Opponent has filed evidence of use from which acquired distinctiveness can be inferred. A discussion of the affidavit of Chris J. Kosmala, Color Programs Manager – Marketing Manager of ICI Canada Inc., is relevant here.

[23]           Mr. Kosmala provides information on the nature of the Opponent’s business, sales figures, and articles in Canadian newspapers indicating that the Opponent’s products sold under its COLOR YOUR WORLD trade-mark as well as its design marks have received media attention.

[24]           The affiant describes the Opponent’s business as specialty retail stores where consumers can find paint, wallpaper, flooring, window coverings, fabric, soft furnishings, home accent pieces, mirrors, framed art and other decorating items. Mr. Kosmala states that the stores also give away and/or sell protective clothing to be worn by customers; however, I note from the photograph of the hat provided in this regard (Exhibit D), that it does not appear to bear any of the Opponent’s COLOR YOUR WORLD  trade-marks. No specific reference, nor any evidence of use of the Opponent’s trade-marks on the gloves in registration TMA210,131, was provided.

[25]           There are 28 COLOR YOUR WORLD stores across Canada; COLOR YOU WORLD trade-marks appear on store signage, business cards and on informational materials. The Opponent also operates 120 other stores in the same business (Glidden/ICI Paint Centres), which also display the COLOR YOUR WORLD trade-marks on signage or on business cards. The affiant further provides that COLOR YOUR WORLD also appears on paint chips (Exhibit F-3) which are displayed in each of the COLOR YOUR WORLD stores and many of the Glidden/ICI Paint Centres.

[26]           Mr. Kosmala provides a yearly breakdown of sales by COLOR YOUR WORLD stores for the years 2003 to 2008. It appears that total sales have exceeded $275 million in the last five years, although I note that sales have declined by more than 50% in recent years. The affiant does not state that these are Canadian sales figures, however, I am willing to make this inference from a fair reading of the affidavit as a whole, since all of the information provided regarding the nature of the business, store locations, publicity and media exposure, relates to Canada.

[27]           In view of the foregoing, I am willing to conclude that the Opponent’s trade-mark has acquired a certain degree of distinctiveness.

Section 6(5)(b )-The length of time each has been in use

[28]           The Opponent’s evidence and sales figures support its assertion of use in Canada since 2003; the Applicant has not filed any evidence of use, so I can only presume that the Applicant has not yet commenced use in Canada. This factor is therefore in the Opponent’s favour.

Section 6(5)(c) and (d) - The nature of the wares, services or business; the nature of the trade

[29]           The Applicant applied to register its Mark in association with wares that can generally be summarized as clothing, bags, perfumery and cosmetics. The Opponent’s wares historically are related to paint, wall paper and related products, and more recently to household decorating items. As the evidence indicates, the Opponent operates specialty stores; its products do not appear to be sold in department stores or retail outlets where clothing is sold.

[30]           While I accept that the Opponent’s wares go beyond paint and wall coverings, to include home decorating products, I see no indication that they have transcended the home decorating market into clothing and personal products. I do not consider the giving away of protective clothing such as hats (or gloves), clearly for use when painting, to be activity related to the retail clothing market. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Opponent’s trade-mark appeared on any such items.

[31]            Mr. Kosmala’s affidavit provides evidence of marketing directed to the transformative mood enhancing effects of colour in our homes (see for example Exhibit H-2); however, there is no evidence that this notion of the transformative effects of colour is specific to the Opponent’s trade-mark, nor does it automatically create a connection to other sectors of the market (such as the clothing industry), where the colour of clothing might also enhance or express certain moods or emotions.

[32]           In sum, the Opponent’s wares and services are provided in its own specialty stores and relate to items used in a residence, and not to products such as clothing, bags, perfumery and cosmetics that are used on a person. Even if the Opponent’s wares were sold in a department store, for example, the respective wares are in different categories, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I find that the nature of the wares and services does not overlap and that the nature of the trades is substantially different. Therefore, this factor heavily favours the Applicant.

Section 6(5)(e) – Degree of resemblance between the trade-marks in appearance, or sound or in the ideas suggested

[33]           Turning to the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks, clearly, the trade-marks at issue have a component that is essentially identical in appearance and when sounded. The trade-marks both contain a similar expression - COLOUR MY WORLD (the Mark) and COLOR YOUR WORLD (Opponent’s trade-mark). The Applicant submits however, that the first portion of the Mark JACKPOT is unique to the Applicant’s trade-mark, and that the first portion of a trade-mark is generally the most important portion for the purposes of distinguishing between trade-marks. Accordingly, it argues that when considering the marks in their entirety, there is no likelihood of confusion.

[34]           It is a generally accepted principle that it is not the proper approach to break the marks into their elements and concentrate upon the elements that are similar, since it is the effect of the marks in their totalities that must be considered [see Ultravite Laboratories Ltd. v. Whitehall Laboratories Ltd. (1965), 44 C.P.R. 189 (S.C.C.)].  In this regard, when viewing the trade-marks in their totalities it is immediately apparent that the inclusion of the distinctive element JACKPOT at the beginning of the trade-mark renders the connotation of the mark somewhat mystifying and as a whole, more distinctive than the Opponent’s mark.

[35]           However, one must also consider the approach of Mr. Justice Rothstein in Masterpiece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc. et al. (2011), 92 C.P.R. (4th) 361 (S.C.C.) at paragraph 64, where he states: “While the first word may, for the purposes of distinctiveness, be the most important in some cases, I think the preferable approach is to first consider whether there is an aspect of the trade-mark that is particularly striking or unique.” In that case, at issue were the trade name used by Masterpiece, Inc, namely, MASTERPIECE, and its trade-marks MASTERPIECE THE ART OF LIVING and MASTERPIECE THE ART OF RETIREMENT LIVING, versus Alavida’s trade-mark - MASTERPIECE LIVING.  Mr. Justice Rothstein reasoned that MASTERPIECE was an aspect striking or unique to these trade-marks and that therefore the marks were confusing. It must be observed, however, that in those trade-marks there is no other striking element; rather the remainder of the words are highly suggestive in association with the retirement residence business.

[36]           In the subject case, whether or not one considers the phrase COLOR YOUR WORD to be a striking or unique aspect of the trade-mark, it is apparent that JACKPOT is more striking and unique in view of its inherent distinctiveness for the reasons set out above. In my view, the phrase COLOR YOUR WORLD (or COLOUR MY WORLD) is not more striking or unique than JACKPOT. Further, the fact that JACKPOT is at the beginning of the Mark, adds to its impact. I am of the view that in this case the principle that the first portion of the trade-mark often serves to distinguish the marks would apply.

Additional Surrounding Circumstance – State of the Register

[37]           As a further surrounding circumstance, both parties provided state of the register evidence. I have reviewed the Opponent’s affidavit of Mary P. Noonan a trade-mark searcher employed by the trade-mark agents for the Opponent. Ms. Noonan attaches the results of an online search of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) Trade-marks Database for allowed applications and current registrations where COLOUR (or COLOR) preceded the word WORLD. The results attached indicate that, within those parameters, there was one allowed application (COLORS OF THE WORLD for hair colour), in addition to the registrations of the Opponent. Although I understand the Opponent’s argument in this regard, I am of the view that the absence on the register of third party trade-marks similar to the Opponent’s is not conclusive evidence that the Opponent’s trade-mark is deserving of a wide ambit of protection that transcends the paint, wallpaper and home decorating market.

[38]           The Applicant filed state of the register evidence in the affidavit of Stephanie Brouillette, member of the Applicant’s trade-mark agent firm. The affiant attaches the results of a search of the CIPO Trade-marks Database for WORLD or COLOUR in combination with “clothing”, “vetements”, “vetement”, and “fashion”. The results include over 300 hits of WORLD and over 30 hits for COLOUR. In addition, the affiant attached particulars of applications and registrations for personal products and/or clothing where the trade-marks were similar in type or concept to the Mark. such as: THE COLOUR OF ELEGANCE, CITY AND COLOUR, THE COLOUR BAR, THOUGHTS IN COLOUR, COLOUR CODE, COLOUR STUDIO, WORLD OF WOMEN, WORLD WITHOUT STRANGERS, LIVWORLD, WORLD OF WEARABLEART, and LIV IN OUR WORLD.  From the multitude of entries on the register, I accept that that WORLD and COLOUR are common words used by third parties in the personal product and clothing lines, and that as such, they also appear in some registered trade-marks consisting of multiple words or slogans.

Likelihood of Confusion

[39]           Although I agree that there is a resemblance between the trade-marks at issue, given the virtually identical phrase in both trade-marks, I find that the element JACKPOT, by virtue of its placement in the Mark and its distinctive character, reduces this resemblance when the trade-marks are viewed in their entirety. In any event, it is my view that in these particular circumstances, the nature of the wares and the channels of the trade is the most significant remaining factor to be considered in assessing the likelihood of confusion. This is so, since the Opponent’s wares are in a different category than personal clothing and perfumery, and typically, use of its trade-mark has been limited to sales in a specific channel of trade, namely its own specialty stores. I see no reason why any reputation of the Opponent would extend beyond its wares to those in the subject application, such that the average consumer would, as a matter of first impression and imperfect recollection, be confused as to the source of the goods, or think that the wares of the Applicant are in some way associated with the wares of the Opponent (United States Polo Assn., supra). On balance, taking into consideration all other surrounding circumstances pursuant to s. 6(5), I find that there is no likelihood of confusion.

[40]            I must therefore conclude that the Applicant has discharged its burden of proof to establish that on a balance of probabilities there is no likelihood of confusion between the Mark and the Opponent’s trade-mark. Accordingly, all of the s. 12(1)(d) grounds of opposition are dismissed.

Section 38(2)(d)/(2) of the Act – Non-Distinctiveness

[41]           Regarding the ground of opposition based on lack of distinctiveness pursuant to s. 2 of the Act,  the Opponent needs to have shown that as of the date of filing of the opposition one or more of its trade-marks had become known sufficiently to negate the distinctiveness of the applied-for mark [Motel 6, Inc. v. No. 6 Motel Ltd. (1981), 56 C.P.R. (2d) 44 at 58 (F.C.T.D.), Re Andres Wines Ltd. and E. & J. Gallo Winery (1975), 25 C.P.R. (2d) 126 at 130 (F.C.A.); Bojangles International, LLC v. Bojangles Café Ltd. (2006), 48 C.P.R. (4th) 427 (F.C.)] .  The Opponent has met its initial burden in this regard by providing ample evidence of the use of its trade-mark; however, having found that there is no likelihood of confusion in this case, I am of the view that the Opponent’s evidence of use cannot serve to negate the distinctiveness of the Mark.  The distinctiveness ground is therefore dismissed.

Disposition

[42]            In view of all of the foregoing, pursuant to the authority delegated to me under s. 63(3) of the Act, I reject the opposition pursuant to s. 38(8) of the Act.

 

_____________________________

P. Heidi Sprung

Member

Trade-marks Opposition Board

Canadian Intellectual Property Office

 

Schedule A

TMA193,123

WARES:
(1) Floor coverings namely, carpeting and carpet undercushion.
(2) Soft furnishings namely pillows, cushions; draperies; valances; and blinds.

SERVICES:
(1) The retail merchandising of home decorating articles and supplies.
(2) Operation of a business, retail home decorating articles and supplies store services namely, retail sale of carpeting, carpet undercushion, draperies, valances, blinds, and soft furnishings.

 

TMA195,678

WARES:
Anti-corrosives and protective coatings and surface compounds, namely: paints, varnishes, enamels, lacquers.

 

TMA210,131

WARES:
Home decorating materials and articles, namely: Abrasives; adhesives; bathtub edging; bedspreads; paint brushes; bulletin boards; carpeting; carpet sundries; carpet tape; casters; caulking guns; caulking - cartridges, tile, and tub; caulking bulk; cement spreaders; wall washing compounds; draperies; drapery hardware; drop sheets; paint dryers; wall patching compounds; floor coatings; floor tile; unfinished furniture; gloves; knives and scrapers; ladders; legs - unfinished; masking tape; masking tape applicators; mat - door; mirrors; linseed oil; overalls; panels - decorative; paints; framed and unframed oil paintings and art reproductions; paint applicators other than by brush or paint sprayer; construction hard hats; scaffolding; seamless flooring; shampoo carpet; shelving; spindlecraft; paint spraying equipment; switch plates; tools used in the surface preparation and application of paint, wall coverings or floor covering; wall covering; wallpaper; wallpaper supplies and tools; waxes for staining, wood polishing and floor polishing; wood bleach.

 

 

TMA579,436 and TMA579,533

WARES:
Paints, varnishes, lacquers; hardeners, driers, thinners, colouring matters, all being additives for paints, varnishes and lacquers; preservatives against rust and against deterioration of wood; priming preparations (in the nature of paint); woodstains; mastic; putty, transfers of paint, lacquers and varnishes; painting accessories, paint brushes, stickers, stencils paint testers.

SERVICES:
Retail merchandising of home decorating articles and supplies; design of interior and exterior décor, advising on choice of colours and textures of paints, varnishes, woodstains, wallcoverings, soft furnishings, carpets, lampshades, furniture coverings, and tinting systems.