IN THE MATTER OF AN OPPOSITION by Cabel Hall Citrus Limited and Trout Hall Ltd. to Application No. 1134316 for the Trade-mark TROUTHALL filed by Robert Latchman_______________________________
I The Proceedings
beverages namely, fruit juices, non-carbonated beverages containing tea extracts, carbonated non-alcoholic beverages (containing fruit juices and flavourings); syrup; drink crystals; canned fruits; dried fruits; preserved fruits; preserves; custard powder; fruit jellies; pudding; pudding mixes; cookies and crackers; baking powder and noodles (the “Wares”);
based on use in Canada since May 1992. The application was subsequently advertised on September 10, 2003 in the Trade-marks Journal for opposition purposes.
II The Statement of Opposition
[5] The grounds of opposition are as follow:
1. The Applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the Mark in view of s. 16(1)(a) and (b) of the Trade-Marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 (the “Act”) because at the date of alleged first use of the Mark it was confusing with the Opponent’s trade-mark TROUT HALL and trade-name Trout Hall Ltd. that had been previously used in Canada by the Opponent;
2. The Applicant’s Mark is not distinctive and does not actually distinguish nor is adapted to distinguish the Wares from the wares of the Opponent;
3. The Applicant’s Mark is not capable of being distinctive of the Applicant as the word TROUT HALL is a geographical location in Jamaica known for its fruit growing;
4. The Mark is not registrable in view of s. 12(1)(b) of the Act because the word TROUT HALL, whether depicted, written or sounded, is either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the English or French language of the place of origin of the Wares.
III General Principles Governing the Grounds of Opposition
[6] The legal burden is upon the Applicant to show that its application complies with the provisions of the Act, but there is however an initial evidential onus on the Opponent to establish the facts relied upon by it in support of each ground of opposition. Once this initial burden is met, the Applicant still has to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the particular grounds of opposition should not prevent the registration of the Mark [see Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Ltd. et al v. Seagram Real Estate Ltd., 3 C.P.R. (3d) 325, at pp. 329-330; John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Companies Ltd., 30 C.P.R. (3d) 293 and Wrangler Apparel Corp. v. The Timberland Company, [2005] F.C. 722].
[7] The relevant dates vary from one ground of opposition to another. They are:
➢ Registrability of the Mark under s. 12(1)(b) of the Act: the filing date of the application (March 15, 2002); [See Zorti Investments Inc. v. Party City Corporation (2004), 36 C.P.R. (4th) 90; Havana Club Holdings S.A. v. Bacardi & Company Limited, (2004) 35 C.P.R. (4th) 541]
➢ Distinctiveness of the Mark: the filing date of the statement of opposition is generally accepted as the relevant date (February 10, 2004). [See Andres Wines Ltd. and E & J Gallo Winery (1975), 25 C.P.R. (2d) 126 at 130 (F.C.A.) and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Stargate Connections Inc. (2004), 34 C.P.R. (4th) 317 (F.C.T.D.)]
➢ Entitlement to the registration of the Mark when the application is based on use: the claimed date of first use (May 1992) [see s. 16(1) of the Act]
IV Ground of Opposition Improperly Pleaded
V Entitlement Ground of Opposition
VI Registrability of the Mark
[19] The Opponent is challenging the registrability of the Mark on the basis that the Mark is either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of the place of origin of the Wares, the whole contrary to s. 12(1)(b) of the Act. The Applicant admitted that the Wares do not originate from Jamaica [see paragraph 14 of Mr. Latchman’s affidavit]. Therefore the Mark cannot be clearly descriptive of the place of origin of the Wares. However could it be deceptively misdescriptive of the place of origin of the Wares? The leading case on this issue is Atlantic Promotions Inc. v. Canada (Registrar of Trade-marks) (1984), 2 C.P.R. (3d) 183 (F.C.T.D.). The concept of deceptively misdescriptive within the meaning of section 12(1)(b) has been defined by Mr. Justice Cattanach in the following terms:
By virtue of para. 26(1)(c) of the Unfair Competition Act registration was prima facie, denied to word marks that "were clearly descriptive or misdescriptive of the character or quality of the wares”. The adverb "clearly" also modified the adjective "misdescriptive".
In para. 12(1)(b) of the Trade-marks Act the word "clearly” as modifying the word "misdescriptive" has been replaced by the word "deceptively" so that it now reads "deceptively misdescriptive". The change was deliberate.
Many words may be "clearly misdescriptive" of the wares with which they are used in association but are not necessarily "deceptively misdescriptive".
In my view the proper test to be applied to the determination as to whether a trade-mark in its entirety is deceptively misdescriptive must be whether the general public in Canada would be misled into the belief that the product with which the trade-mark is associated had its origin the place of a geographic name in the trade-mark.
Whether a trade-mark is deceptively misdescriptive is as much a question of fact as is whether one trade-mark is confusing with another.
[See also T.G. Bright & Co. v. Canada (Registrar of Trade-marks) (1985), 4 C.P.R. (3d) 64 (Fed. T.D.)] (my underlines)
12. Due to the long association with Jamaica, within the immigrant customers based now in Canada which are still reliant on products such as limes, papaya and mangoes from West Indies, the name TROUT HALL would indicate goods produced on the Trout Hall Estate and therefore is associated with my company.
13. I therefore assert that having regard the long and extensive use of TROUT HALL, the reputation that my company has for producing quality fruits and the limited market for products such as mangoes, the name TROUT HALL is and continues to be associated with my company and the only reason that the applicant could or would have adopted TROUTHALL is to trade on our reputation and residual rights established in Canada.
[25] She also contacted the Jamaican Information Service and reports the information provided to her. Such information constitutes inadmissible hearsay evidence.
[26] In summary, no evidence has been provided to show that Jamaican immigrants now living in Canada nor Canadians would associate Trout Hall with a location in Jamaica known as an area where citrus fruits are grown.
[27] As for the content of Mr. Sharp’s affidavit sworn on May 23, 2006, I do not consider such evidence proper evidence in reply. In this regard paragraphs 3 to 19 are not reply allegations and discuss the prior use of the Opponent’s trade-mark TROUT HALL from 1934 to 1997. Such evidence should have been part of the Opponent’s evidence under rule 41 and as such it will not be considered. In any event those allegations do not address the issue of the Mark being deceptively misdescriptive.
[28] Applying the test set forth in Atlantic, the evidence summarized above does not enable me to conclude that the Mark would be deceptively misdescriptive of the place of origin of the Wares. The fourth ground of opposition is dismissed.
VII Distinctiveness
[29] The third ground of opposition is also based on the descriptiveness of the place of origin of the Wares. For the same reasons detailed under the analysis of the registrability of the Mark, I am also dismissing this ground of opposition.
VIII Conclusion
[30] Having been delegated authority by the Registrar of Trade-marks by virtue of s. 63(3) of the Act, I reject the Opponent’s opposition pursuant to s. 38(8) of the Act.
DATED IN BOUCHERVILLE, QUEBEC, THIS 11th DAY OF MAY 2009.
Jean Carrière,
Member of the Trade-marks Opposition Board