LE REGISTRAIRE DES MARQUES DE COMMERCE

THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE-MARKS

Citation: 2019 TMOB 36

Date of Decision: 2019-03-31

IN THE MATTER OF AN OPPOSITION

 

	X.E.S.-NY LTD. and Joseph A. Company LLC	Opponents
and
	Joseph Limited	Applicant
	1,424,610 for the trade-mark JOSEPH	Application

File Record

[1]  On January 15, 2009, Joseph Limited (the Applicant) filed an application to register the trade-mark JOSEPH (the Mark) on the basis of its proposed use in Canada.  On July 3, 2015 a decision was rendered in an opposition to this application by Boutique Jacob Inc. refusing some of the goods and services.  The remaining goods and services still at issue in this opposition are (the Goods and Services):

 (1) Cosmetics; non medicated toilet preparations, namely, deodorant, body lotion, face cream, shampoo, conditioner, hair spray; essential oils for personal use; hair lotions; dentifrices; leather and imitations of leather; travelling trunks; travelling bags; cosmetic and garment bags; briefcases; umbrellas; walking sticks; suitcases; wallets; footwear, namely boots, slippers, sandals, athletic shoes, dress shoes and casual shoes; headgear, namely hats, caps and bridal head pieces.

(1) Retail services connected with the sale of perfumery, cosmetics, beauty care products, make-up, cases for spectacles and sunglasses, jewellery, leather goods, umbrellas, footwear and headgear; mail order retail services connected with perfumery, cosmetics, beauty care products, make-up, cases for spectacles and sunglasses, jewellery, leather goods, umbrellas, footwear and headgear; electronic shopping retail services connected with perfumery, cosmetics, beauty care products, make-up, cases for spectacles and sunglasses, jewellery, leather goods, belts, umbrellas, footwear and headgear.

[2]  The application was advertised for opposition purposes in the Trade-marks Journal of March 21, 2012.

[3]  On August 20,2012, X.E.S.-NY LTD. filed a statement of opposition. The statement of opposition was subsequently amended to add Joseph A. Company LLC as a second opponent  (unless specified otherwise X.E.S.-NY LTD. and Joseph A. Company LLC are collectively referred to as the Opponent).  The amended statement of opposition pleads the grounds summarized below:

(a)  the application does not comply with section 30(a) of the Trade-marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 (the Act) since the following Goods and Services are not described in ordinary commercial terms:  perfumery; leather and imitation of leather; and shoulder belts;

(b)  the application does not comply with section 30(e) of the Act since the Applicant did not intend to use the Mark in Canada with each of the Goods and Services;

(c)  the application does not comply with section 30(i) of the Act as the Applicant could not be satisfied that it is entitled to use the Mark in Canada since the Applicant was well aware of the existence of the Opponent’s trade-mark;

(d)  the Mark is not registrable pursuant to section 12(1)(a) of the Act as the Mark is a word which is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual and the Mark was not distinctive at the filing date of the Application;

(e)  the Mark is not registrable pursuant to section 12(1)(d) of the Act as it is confusing with registration No. TMA659,073 for the trade-mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? for the goods ladies' apparel, namely, sweaters and vests;

(f)  the Applicant is not the person entitled to registration under section 16(3)(a) as the Mark is confusing with the Opponent’s trade-mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? used with wearing apparel;

(g)  the Mark is not distinctive since it does not actually distinguish or is adapted to distinguish or is capable of distinguishing the Goods and Services of the Applicant from the goods and services of the Opponent with the trade-mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK?

At the hearing, the Opponent withdrew the section 12(1)(a) ground of opposition.  As such, this ground of opposition will not be discussed further.

[4]  The Applicant filed and served a counter statement in which it denied the Opponent’s allegations.

[5]  The Opponent filed as its evidence the affidavit of Manu Mirchandani.  The Applicant filed as its evidence the affidavits of Carolyn Hewitt, Michael Stephan, Nina Dyson, Lindsay Owen, Kimberley Newport-Mimran, Tina LeBrun, Thomas James and Catherine Palmer.  The Opponent filed as its reply evidence the affidavit of Bonnie Stein.  Mr. Mirchandani was cross-examined on his affidavit.

[6]  Both parties filed a written argument and attended a hearing.

Material Dates and Onus

[7]  The material dates with respect to the grounds of opposition are:

[8]  Before considering the grounds of opposition, it is necessary to review some of the technical requirements with regard to (i) the evidential burden on an opponent to support the allegations in the statement of opposition and (ii) the legal onus on an applicant to prove its case. 

[9]  With respect to (i) above, there is an evidential burden on the opponent to prove the facts in its allegations pleaded in the statement of opposition: John Labatt Limited v Molson Companies Limited (1990), 30 CPR (3d) 293 (FCTD) at 298. The presence of an evidential burden on an opponent with respect to a particular issue means that in order for the issue to be considered at all, there must be sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably be concluded that the facts alleged to support that issue exist. With respect to (ii) above, the legal onus is on an applicant to show that the application does not contravene the provisions of the Act as alleged by an opponent (for those allegations for which the opponent has met its evidential burden). The presence of a legal onus on the applicant means that if a determinate conclusion cannot be reached once all the evidence is in, then the issue must be decided against an applicant. 

Preliminary Issues

Preliminary Issue: Admissibility of Ms. Stein’s affidavit

[10]  The Applicant objects to the reply affidavit of Bonnie Stein on the basis that it is not proper reply.  Pursuant to section 43 of the Trade-marks Regulations SOR/96-195, reply evidence must be strictly confined to matters in reply.  The Applicant submits that the reply affidavit of Ms. Stein is improper since it includes evidence which could have been included in the Opponent’s evidence in chief.  The Opponent submits that the reply evidence is proper because it fills in gaps in the evidence identified in the cross-examination.  With the exception of paragraph 6 which provides evidence on the availability of lower end and higher end brands in the same location, the remaining evidence could have been filed as part of the Opponent’s case in chief and is not proper [Halford v Seed Hawk Inc  2003 FCT 141 at paras 14-15].  If my finding that these paragraphs are inadmissible is incorrect, I note that excluding this evidence would not have affected my disposition of the case.

Preliminary Issue: Mr. Mirchandani’s Statements About Confusion

[11]   Mr. Mirchandani’s statements about the potential for confusion have been disregarded. As the Registrar explains in Advance Magazine Publishers Inc v Casciato, 2004 CanLII 72180 (TMOB) at paras 12-14:

It is not uncommon for affiants to express their view on the likelihood of confusion and the like, but the Registrar disregards such self-serving statements because it is generally not the role of an affiant to make such conclusions.

Grounds of Opposition Based on Confusion

[12]  The statement of opposition includes three grounds based on confusion.  I am satisfied that the Opponent has met its initial burden with respect to each of these grounds on the basis of the relied upon registration and evidence of Mr. Mirchandani, the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Joseph A. Company LLC:

(a)  With respect to the section 12(1)(d) ground of opposition, the Opponent’s burden is met as I have have checked the Register to confirm that registration No. TMA659,073 for JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? for ladies' apparel, namely, sweaters and vests is extant [Quaker Oats Co of Canada v Menu Foods Ltd (1986), 11 CPR (3d) 410 (TMOB)].  

(b)  With respect to section 16(3)(a), the burden is met by the evidence of (i) use of the trade-mark by Joseph A. Company LLC in Canada on hang tags and fabric tags and (ii) sales of ladies apparel such as tops, sweaters and jackets prior to the filing date of the application [Mirchandani Affidavit, Exhibits B-H; Exhibits J-L].

(c)  With respect to the distinctiveness ground of opposition, the evidence of Mr. Michandani including the Opponent’s trade-mark on fabric tags and hang tags and sales information discussed below shows that the Opponent’s trade-mark has become known sufficiently to negate the distinctiveness of the Mark [Bojangles, Motel 6, Inc v No 6 Motel Ltd (1981), 56 CPR (2d) 44 (FCTD) at 58].

Test for Confusion

[13]  Trade-marks are confusing when there is a reasonable likelihood of confusion within the meaning of section 6(2) of the Trade-marks Act: 

  The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the goods or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured  . . . or performed by the same person, whether or not the goods or services are of the same general class.

[14]  Thus, the issue is not confusion between the trade-marks themselves, but confusion of goods and services from one source as being from another source. In the instant case, the question posed by section 6(2) is whether purchasers of the Goods and Services, sold in association with the trade-mark JOSEPH, would believe that those items were produced or authorized or licensed by the Opponent.

[15]  The test for confusion is one of first impression and imperfect recollection. Factors to be considered, in making an assessment as to whether two marks are confusing, are “all the surrounding circumstances” including those specifically mentioned in section 6(5) of the Act: the inherent distinctiveness of the marks and the extent to which they have become known; the length of time each has been in use; the nature of the goods, services or business; the nature of the trade; the degree of resemblance in appearance or sound of the marks or in the ideas suggested by them.  These criteria are not exhaustive and different weight will be given to each one in a context specific assessment [Mattel, Inc v 3894207 Canada Inc, [2006] 1 SCR 772 (SCC) at para 54].  I also refer to Masterpiece Inc v Alavida Lifestyles Inc, (2011), 92 CPR (4th) 361 (SCC) at para 49, where the Supreme Court of Canada states that section 6(5)(e), the resemblance between the marks, will often have the greatest effect on the confusion analysis. 

 

Inherent Distinctiveness

[16]  The Mark is comprised of a given name and as such has a very low degree of inherent distinctiveness [Glaskoch B. Koch Jr GmbH & Co KG v Anglo Canadian Mercantile Co (2006), Carswell Nat 5362 (TMOB)].  The Opponent’s registered trade- mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? also has a limited degree of inherent distinctiveness as it is composed of a given name, an initial and the suggestive phrase QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK?

Degree of Resemblance Between the Trade-marks

[17]  The Opponent’s trade-mark includes the name JOSEPH A. and the phrase QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? The Applicant’s trade-mark consists solely of the name JOSEPH. Thus, there is a fair degree of resemblance between the marks in appearance and as sounded owing to the shared component JOSEPH. There is less resemblance in ideas suggested as the Mark suggests Goods and Services by a designer with the first name JOSEPH and the Opponent’s trade-mark suggests clothing by a designer with the name JOSEPH A. (with the A being the first letter of the designer’s middle name or last name) and that the clothing is soft and feels like silk.  When the last factor in section 6(5) is considered in each of its three aspects, that is, in appearance, in sound and in idea suggested, I conclude that the resemblance between the marks favours neither party to a significant extent or slightly favours the Applicant.

Extent Known and Length of Time in Use

[18]  These factors favour the Opponent as it has used its trade-mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? to a greater extent and for a longer time as compared to the Applicant’s use of its Mark in association with the Goods and Services.  Mr. Mirchandani’s evidence is that:

(a)  The JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? brand is sold in several retail establishments throughout Canada, including Winners, La Maison Simons, and Beyond the Rack (Mirchandani affidavit, para 8).

(b)  The representative invoices evidence sales in 2009-2013 of tops described as cardigans, turtlenecks, crew tops, sleeveless tanks and a French terry jacket (Mirchandani affidavit, Exhibit B) sold with labels and hand tags displaying the trade-mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? 

(c)  The Opponent has annual sales in Canada in excess of $0.9 million for each of the years 2011-2014 (Mirchandani affidavit , para 9, answers to undertakings).

[19]  The Applicant’s affiant, Ms. Palmer, the Applicant’s Legal and Administrative Director, gives evidence that:

(a)  The Applicant is a fashion house founded by Joseph Ettedgui in 1972.  It has a full collection for women and is growing its offer for menswear (Palmer affidavit, para 4).  Its clothing and handbags have been available for sale in Canada since 2001 and summer 2013 respectively and are carried by retailers such as are carried by stores in Canada including Holt Renfrew, Hudson’s Bay, Pink Tartan  and  T.N.T., and are sold at on-line retailers such as www.net-a-porter.com and www.shopbop.com (Palmer affidavit paras 6, 11,14-15, Exhibit F).  Ms. Palmer explains that the Applicant’s  goods are haute couture, high end fashion items (para 15).  I note that the Applicant’s short sleeve shirts are available for sale on the Pink Tartan website www.pinktartan.com for approximately US$495 (Palmer affidavit, Exhibit H).  However, this evidence does not assist the Applicant in demonstrating extent known since clothing and handbags are not included in the Goods and Services.

(b)  The Applicant has used the JOSEPH trade-mark since February 1, 2013 in Canada in association with on-line retail services (Palmer affidavit, para 8, Exhibit G). However, no information has been given which evidences the use of the Mark with the Services as opposed to on-line sales of, for example, clothing.

Nature of the Goods and Services and Trade

[20]  I do not find that these factors favour either party.  The Opponent’s registered goods are ladies’ apparel, namely, sweaters and vests and it has shown use in association with a variety of ladies’ tops including cardigans, turtlenecks, crew tops, sleeveless tanks and French terry jacket (Mirchandani affidavit, Exhibits B-I).  The Goods and Services can be described as related as they include other fashion items (ie) footwear and headgear and items such as cosmetics and briefcases, and which may well be sold in stores which sell ladies apparel.  That being said, the Goods and Services are likely to be sold in different sections of these stores.  The fact that the parties’ goods are sold at different “price points”, with the Opponent’s being sold at a lower price point and the Applicant’s at a higher price point [see Stephan affidavit, paras 2-7; Mirchandani affidavit, Exhibit M] is not relevant to the issue of confusion [Bagagerie SA v. Bagagerie Willy Ltée (1992), 45 CPR (3d) 503 (FCA) at 509-51].  Further, I note that there is uncontroverted evidence that high end designer and less expensive lower end brands may be sold at the same stores (Stein affidavit, para 6).  Finally, given the narrow range of clothing sold by the Opponent, I do not see the Goods and Services being in the natural zone of expansion for the Opponent.

State of the Register Evidence and Marketplace

[21]  The state of the register and marketplace evidence in the affidavit of Thomas James, a Thomson CompuMark Trademark Research-Analyst, and Michael Stephan, a Senior Investigator, is not a relevant surrounding circumstance.  The Applicant's evidence of trade-marks consisting of or including JOSEPH or JOSEF, including JOSEF, JOSEPH ABBOUD, JOSEPH JANARD, JOSEPH & FEISS, and JOSEPH is insufficient in number for me to conclude that there is a diminished likelihood of confusion between the Mark and the Opponent’s trade-mark [Ports International Ltd v Dunlop Ltd (1992), 41 CPR (3d) 432 (TMOB); Welch Foods Inc v Del Monte Corp (1992), 44 CPR (3d) 205 (FCTD), (1991), 36 CPR (3d) 562 (TMOB); Kellogg Salada Canada Inc v Maximum Nutrition Ltd (1992), 43 CPR (3d) 349 (FCA)]. Further, the marks comprising the common elements should be in fairly extensive use in the market in which the marks under consideration are being used or will be used [Kellog Salada, supra at 359] and there is no such evidence in this case. Therefore, I cannot infer that Canadian customers are accustomed to seeing numerous trade-marks consisting of or containing JOSEPH in the parties’ field of interest such that they can distinguish them.

Surrounding Circumstance:  Jurisprudence Concerning Weak Trade-marks

[22]  The jurisprudence on weak trade-marks significantly favours the Applicant.  It is well settled that trade-marks consisting of given names are entitled to a very small ambit of protection [Sarah Coventry Inc v Abrahamian (1984), 1 CPR (3d) 238 (FCTD), at 24; Joseph Ltd v XES-NY Ltd 2005 CarswellNat 522, 2005 CarswellNat 523, 44 CPR (4th) 314] and that comparatively small differences will suffice to distinguish between weak marks [Boston Pizza International Inc v Boston Chicken Inc (2001), 15 CPR (4th) 345 (FCTD) at para 66].  In Provigo Distribution Inc v Max Mara Fashion Group SRL (2005), 46 CPR (4th) 112 at para 31 (FCTD), de Montigny J. explained:

The two marks being inherently weak, it is fair to say that even small differences will be sufficient to distinguish among them. Were it otherwise, first user of words in common use would be unfairly allowed to monopolize these words. A further justification given by courts in coming to this conclusion is that the public is expected to be more on its guard when such weak trade names are used …

[23]  Further, a party adopting a weak trade-mark has been held to accept some risk of confusion [General Motors v Bellows (1949), 10 CPR 101 at 115-116 (SCC)]. 

Surrounding Circumstance: Opponent Owns a Registration With No Restriction in the Channel of Trade

[24]  At the hearing, the Opponent submitted that by virtue of owning a registration with no restriction in the channel of trade, its ambit of protection is greater.  The Registrar has consistently held even where a trade-mark registration has been obtained for a weak trade-mark, the registration is restricted to a narrow ambit of protection [see, for example, Canada Games Co v Llumar Star Kites Inc (1994) 55 CPR (3d) 251 (TMOB)]. 

Surrounding Circumstance: Clothing Was Deleted From the Application

[25]  At the hearing, the Opponent submitted that the fact that the application was amended to delete clothing was a relevant surrounding circumstance.  The evidence is that the Applicant and the Opponent are not competitors in the clothing business, nor do they target the same consumers.  As such, I do not find the fact that the application as filed included clothing which was subsequently deleted to favour the Opponent to a significant extent. 

Surrounding Circumstance: Evidence From Those in the Fashion Industry

[26]  I do not consider the statements of Nina Dyson, Lindsay Owen, and Kimberley Newport-Mimran, that each is not aware of any instances of confusion between the Mark and the Opponent’s trade-mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? to be a relevant surrounding circumstance.  Each of these affiants attests that they are a director of or are employed by a high end clothing store which carries clothing by the Applicant and that they have never sold products by the Opponent.  They each further state that they are not aware of any instances of confusion.   It may be that the absence of actual confusion can be explained by the fact that the parties do not currently sell their goods through any of the same stores [Levi Strauss & Co v Warehouse One Clothing Ltd 2015 TMOB 209 at para 60]. I am therefore not prepared to draw any adverse inference based on the lack of evidence of instances of actual confusion in this case.

Surrounding Circumstances: Additional Distinguishing Matter is Required

[27]  In its written submissions and at the hearing, the Opponent argued that additional matter is required to enable the Mark to be distinctive and to be distinguished from the Opponent’s trade-mark.  I excerpt paragraphs from the Opponent’s written argument below (citations omitted):

7v	Although the Canadian Trademarks Register shows co-existence of the Opponents’ JOSEPH A. Mark with other registered or allowed marks that contain the element “JOSEPH”, these other marks all include matter in addition to “JOSEPH” (for example,”JOSEPH ABBOUD”) or are spelled differently (for example, JOSEF).  The Opponents’ JOSEPH A. Mark does not co-exist on the Register with any other marks that are only “JOSEPH” alone in association with “clothing”.
62	Common characteristics shared between marks owned by different traders are considered “a common feature in the trade”, which tends to negative any proprietorial significance of such common feature.  As a consequence, the existence of marks having the same common word for the same or similar goods prevents a trader from asserting a monopoly in respect of that word for such goods.
65	“JOSEPH” alone also lacks proprietorial significance and cannot be the subject of a monopoly because there is ample evidence of many traders that have registered and employ marks that are “JOSEPH” plus other matter, in association with their goods and services in the fashion industry.
66	The Applicant has also taken the position that “JOSEPH” is a common feature in the trade.
67	A monopoly cannot be asserted over the common feature “JOSEPH” alone.  The [Mark] therefore lacks inherent distinctiveness.
70	Because the [Mark] as not been “used” in association with the goods and services in the Application, the [Mark] also lacks acquired distinctiveness in association with such goods and services.

[28]  First, even if JOSEPH has been adopted and registered by other traders as a component of their trade-marks, the evidence is not such that I could find that trade-marks consisting of JOSEPH alone are commonly adopted.  Second, if the Mark is not confusing with the Opponent’s relied upon trade-mark in its statement of opposition and the Applicant meets its legal onus on the issue of distinctiveness (which in this case is based on an allegation of confusion with the Opponent’s trade-mark), the opposition must be rejected.  In particular, with respect to the Opponent’s distinctiveness ground which is set out below, I do not find that the Opponent has alleged that the trade-mark lacks inherent distinctiveness. As such, I am not permitted to refuse it on that basis [Massif Inc. c. Station Touristique Massif du Sud (1993) Inc. (2011), 95 CPR (4th) 249 (F.C.) at paras 27-29].

The Mark is not distinctive within the meaning of section 2 of the Act since it does not actually distinguish and is neither adapted to distinguish nor is capable of distinguishing the [Goods and Services], from the wares and services of others, and more particularly from the wares of the Opponents in association with which the latter has used and is still using its trade-mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK? in Canada.

Surrounding Circumstance: Examiner Did Not Issue a Section 37(3) Notice

[29]  The fact that the Examiner did not issue a notice pursuant to section 37(3) of the Act is not a relevant surrounding circumstance (see the file history attached as Exhibit 1 to the affidavit of Carolyn Hewitt).  A decision by an Examiner of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office has no precedential value for the Opposition Board because both the onus and evidence before an Examiner differs from that before the Opposition Board [Thomas J Lipton Inc v Boyd Coffee Co (1991), 40 CPR (3d) 272 (TMOB) at 277 and Procter & Gamble Inc v Morlee Corp (1993), 48 CPR (3d) 377 (TMOB) at 386].

Conclusion

[30]  The question posed by section 6(2) of the Act is whether customers of the Goods and Services, provided under the trade-mark JOSEPH, would believe that those goods and services were provided or authorized or licensed by the Opponent owing to its trade-mark JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK?

[31]   The test to be applied is a matter of first impression in the mind of a casual consumer somewhat in a hurry who sees the trade-mark JOSEPH in association with the Goods and Services when he or she has no more than an imperfect recollection of the Opponent’s JOSEPH A. QU’EST-CE QUE C’EST SILK?  trade-mark, and does not pause to give the matter any detailed consideration or scrutiny [Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, 2006 SCC 23 at para 20]. 

[32]  While the Opponent has established that its trade-mark is known to some extent in Canada and that the nature of the Goods and Services and trade overlap with that of the Opponent, the Opponent’s trade-mark is a weak trade-mark. In view of this and the differences between the trade-marks, I conclude that the balance of probabilities between finding that there is no reasonable likelihood of confusion, and finding that there is a reasonable likelihood of confusion, falls slightly in favour of the Applicant.  My conclusion is the same at each of the different material dates for the grounds of opposition: the date of filing the application (section 16(3)(a)), the date of filing the statement of opposition (distinctiveness) and the date of my decision (section 12(1)(d)).   Accordingly, the section 12(1)(d) ground of opposition is rejected.

 

Grounds of Opposition which May be Summarily Rejected

 

Section 30(a) Ground of Opposition

[33]  The Opponent alleges that the application does not contain a statement in ordinary commercial terms with respect to the goods described as perfumery, leather and imitations of leather and shoulder belts.  An opponent's initial evidential burden under section 30(a) is a light one and may be met through argument [McDonald's Corp v M.A. Comacho-Saldana International Trading Ltd (1984), 1 CPR (3d) 101 (TMOB) at 104; Air Miles International Trading BV v Deutsche Lufthansa AG (2010), 89 CPR (4th) 230 (TMOB) at para 30]. In this case, the Opponent has not made any submissions, nor filed any evidence directed to this ground.  The Opponent, therefore, fails to meet its initial burden and this ground of opposition is rejected.

Section 30(e) Ground of Opposition

[34]  There is no evidence that the Applicant did not intend to commence use in Canada in association with the Goods and Services.  As such, this ground of opposition is rejected.

Section 30(i) Ground of Opposition

[35]  The section 30(i) ground of opposition alleges that the Applicant could not have been satisfied that it was entitled to use the Mark because it was aware of the Opponent’s trade-mark rights.  Where an applicant has provided the statement required by section 30(i), this ground should only succeed in exceptional cases such as where there is evidence of bad faith [Sapodilla Co v Bristol-Myers Co (1974), 15 CPR (2d) 152 (TMOB) at 155]. As the application includes the required statement and there is no evidence of bad faith or other exceptional circumstances, the section 30(i) ground is rejected.

 

Disposition

[36]  Pursuant to the authority delegated to me under section 63(3) of the Act, I reject the opposition pursuant to section 38(8) of the Act.

 

____________________________
Natalie de Paulsen
Member
Trade-marks Opposition Board
Canadian Intellectual Property Office

 

 

 

 

 

TRADE-MARKS OPPOSITION BOARD

CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE

APPEARANCES AND AGENTS OF RECORD

___________________________________________________

HEARING DATE 2018-11-20

APPEARANCES

Janice Bereskin Tamara Céline Winegust	FOR THE OPPONENT
Michelle L. Wassenar	FOR THE APPLICANT

AGENT OF RECORD

Bereskin & Parr LLP/S.E.N.C.R.L., S.R.L.	FOR THE OPPONENT
Method Professional Law Corporation	FOR THE APPLICANT